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S U M M A R Y
Objectives: To describe trends in major communicable diseases in Syria during the ongoing conﬂict, and
the challenges to communicable disease surveillance and control in the context of dynamic, large-scale
population displacement, unplanned mass gatherings, and disruption to critical infrastructure.
Methods: A rapid review of the peer-reviewed and non-peer-reviewed literature from 2005 to 2015 was
performed, augmented by secondary analysis of monitoring data from two disease early warning
systems currently operational in Syria, focusing mainly on three diseases: tuberculosis (TB), measles, and
polio.
Results: Trend data show discrepancies in case report numbers between government and non-
government controlled areas, especially for TB, but interpretation is hampered by uncertainties over
sentinel surveillance coverage and base population numbers. Communicable disease control has been
undermined by a combination of governance fragmentation, direct and indirect damage to facilities and
systems, and health worker ﬂight.
Conclusions: Five years into the crisis, some progress has been made in disease surveillance, but governance
and coordination problems, variable immunization coverage, and the dynamic and indiscriminate nature of
the conﬂict continue to pose a serious threat to population health in Syria and surrounding countries. The risk
of major cross-border communicable disease outbreaks is high, and challenges for health in a post-conﬂict
Syria are formidable.
 2016 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of International Society for Infectious Diseases.
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-
nc-nd/4.0/).
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The impact of conﬂict on communicable disease spread is well
recognized, resulting from a combination of damage to critical
infrastructure, including water and sanitation systems, reduced
health system functionality, and – importantly – disruption to* Corresponding author.
E-mail address: sharif.ismail15@imperial.ac.uk (S.A. Ismail).
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license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).surveillance, outbreak response systems, and other disease control
measures.1,2 High proﬁle outbreaks in Iraq and Syria in recent years
have provided further evidence of this conﬂict-related public health
threat in the Middle East, exposing the fragility of existing systems
and the difﬁculties faced in maintaining and strengthening them.3,4
Guidance for health interventions in complex emergencies
consistently highlights the need for simple but effective health
intelligence systems covering mortality and morbidity data,
laboratory services to support prompt diagnosis, and outbreak
response planning, among other elements.5–7 In disease surveillanceciety for Infectious Diseases. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
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syndromes associated with diseases of public health importance
(e.g. ‘inﬂuenza-like illness’) rather than formal laboratory diagnosis
– are increasingly important in conﬂict-affected environments
where passive, laboratory report-based systems may be impracti-
cal.8,9 Early warning systems have signiﬁcant advantages in
timeliness of reporting, ﬂexibility to incorporate new syndromes
of concern, and low administrative and laboratory burden. However,
there are equally well-recognized limitations, including low
speciﬁcity and positive predictive value (especially for diseases
with non-speciﬁc symptom proﬁles) and high false-alarm rates,
which contribute to difﬁculties identifying true departures from
statistical norms for outbreak detection purposes.10
The nature of the conﬂict in Syria poses particularly formidable
challenges to the practical implementation of communicable
disease surveillance and control for several reasons. First and
foremost among these is the scale of population displacement that
has occurred since the start of the conﬂict. Around 6.6 million
Syrians have been internally displaced, many on multiple
occasions,11 with over four million refugees now outside the
country.12 The rapidity and regularity of these movements both
within Syria and across its borders pose signiﬁcant barriers to the
effective and timely collection of data. On one hand, the crisis
demands new strategies for ‘undocumented’ populations or those
living in informal settings, who account for up to 80% of refugees
now living in some neighbouring countries.13 On the other,
surveillance and control strategies must also apply to established
and sizeable refugee populations in recognized camps, the
existence of which predated the conﬂict (Yarmouk camp in
Damascus, for example).
Second, the dynamics of the conﬂict in Syria – in particular the
lack of regard for civilian safety, healthcare workers, and health
facilities by warring parties – imposes major constraints on what is
possible in surveillance and prevention. It is estimated that over
seven million people within Syria are without access to basic
healthcare,14 and malnutrition – a major risk factor for the spread
of communicable disease – is a worsening problem especially
among besieged populations. Third, a lack of donor funding for the
health response in general has hampered efforts by the World
Health Organization (WHO) to establish and maintain effective
monitoring systems throughout Syria. Finally, a combination of
direct and indirect infrastructure damage, loss of trained person-
nel, and equipment shortages has undermined the capacity of what
was a relatively well-functioning health system by middle-income
country standards.15,16
The objectives of this paper are to examine the technical
challenges to communicable disease prevention and control that
have arisen in Syria and approaches implemented to date, with a
view to providing realistic recommendations for improvement.
The analysis was carried out in recognition of complex, ground-
level realities featuring a combination of large-scale displacement
and planned and unplanned mass gatherings in both formal and
informal settings, and the immense personal safety risks to which
many health workers in Syria are routinely exposed. The focus is
placed on three exemplar diseases – measles, polio, and
tuberculosis (TB) – with an emphasis on the situation inside
Syria, although reference is also made to the situation in Turkey
and Lebanon, countries that now host the largest numbers of
Syrian refugees.
2. Methodology and conceptual framework
A rapid review of the peer-reviewed and non-peer-reviewed
literature over a 10-year period between 2005 and 2015 was
conducted to inform an assessment of communicable disease
surveillance in Syria at ‘baseline’ (i.e., prior to the onset of thecrisis). Non-peer-reviewed data included material from reports
published by multilateral organizations including the WHO and
the United Nations Ofﬁce for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs (UNOCHA), international donors, and non-governmental
organizations with a signiﬁcant ﬁeld presence in Syria and
surrounding countries. This was augmented by the analysis of
data drawn from the two principal syndromic surveillance systems
currently in operation in Syria: the Early Warning and Response
System (EWARS) for Syria,17 a system jointly administered by the
WHO and the Syrian Ministry of Health, and the Early Warning and
Response Network (EWARN),18 administered by the Assistance
Coordination Unit (ACU), which operates only in non-government
controlled areas (NGCAs). The ACU was established in September
2012 by the Syrian National Coalition to coordinate increasing
volumes of aid coming into NGCAs, provide some basic services,
and support local committees involved in information and basic
service provision on the ground; its activities now incorporate
epidemiological surveillance. The analysis focused on case
reporting for TB, measles, and acute ﬂaccid paralysis (AFP), the
clinical case description for suspected polio, and incorporated
reports from week 1 in 2014 to week 48 in 2015 (the period for
which weekly reports under both systems were available at the
time of writing).
In assessing communicable disease surveillance and response
capacities in Syria, guidance was taken from the framework for
assessing capacity for implementation of the International Health
Regulations (IHRs) on a national level, issued by the WHO in
2010.19 This framework addresses governance and coordination,
surveillance, outbreak preparedness and response, human re-
source development, and laboratory capacity, among other
domains.
3. Results
3.1. Trends in major communicable disease groups in Syria, and issues
in surveillance
Trend data from EWARN and EWARS over 2014 and 2015
(Figure 1) describe large variations in reports of suspected cases
week by week in both systems, notwithstanding broadly similar
case deﬁnitions for the three main diseases examined in this
review (Table 1). Signiﬁcant discrepancies by disease group are
also visible; in particular, the reported case numbers for TB from
EWARS are much greater than for EWARN. Upward trends in
reports of severe acute respiratory illness (SARI – a general
category including typical and atypical pneumonia, but excluding
inﬂuenza-like illness) and acute bloody diarrhoea (ABD) are noted
from EWARN data towards the end of 2015 and are suggestive of
large outbreaks distinct from those reported earlier in the
conﬂict.20 Trends for measles case reporting through EWARN
and EWARS appear better matched, albeit from a proportionately
lower number of consults and sentinel sites for EWARN (Figure 2).
Trends for AFP are not given in Figure 1 because case report
numbers were low throughout the period; there were an average
of 3.3 and 2.4 cases per week under EWARN and EWARS,
respectively.
Detailed interpretation of these patterns is difﬁcult for several
reasons. First, variations in total numbers of consultations (trends
for which were particularly erratic for EWARS at the beginning of
the period) and sentinel site coverage both over time and between
the two systems may partially explain observed trends. Sentinel
site numbers for EWARS and EWARN rose by 120% and 260%,
respectively, over the period, with broadly comparable median
reporting rates at 83% and 86%, respectively. However, these
factors are unlikely to account for relatively stable total consulta-
tion numbers reported through EWARS compared with a dramatic
Figure 1. Trends in reported cases of major disease groups in Syria from the World Health Organization Early Warning and Response System (WHO EWARS; red) and the
Assistance Coordination Unit Early Warning and Response Network (ACU EWARN; blue) in 2014 and 2015.
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dynamics across Syria is complicated by continuing uncertainty
over the geographical coverage of the two surveillance systems,
the ﬂuidity of developments on the ground, and the immenseTable 1
Surveillance case deﬁnitions and alert and outbreak thresholds used by EWARS and EW
Disease/condition Case deﬁnitions Alert threshol
WHO EWARS ACU EWARN WHO EWARS 
Suspected measles Any person with fever AND maculopapular
generalized rash AND one of the following:
cough, coryza, or conjunctivitis OR any
person in whom a clinician suspects
measles infection (deﬁnition now common
to both systems)
1 suspected ca
Acute ﬂaccid
paralysis (AFP)
Any child under 15 years of age with AFP OR
any person of any age with paralytic illness
if poliomyelitis is suspected (except for
traumatic paralysis) (deﬁnition common to
both systems)
1 suspected ca
Tuberculosis (TB) TB is not on the core
surveillance list at
present. Conﬁrmed
cases in line with
the National TB
Programme case
deﬁnition are
included, i.e., a
constant cough for
3 weeks, or cough
with bloody
sputum, without
improvement with
speciﬁed
treatment, or the
presence of the
following
symptoms: fatigue,
loss of appetite,
weight loss, night
sweats, fever,
shortness of breath,
chest pain
TB is not on the core
surveillance list at
present. Only
information on
conﬁrmed TB
diagnoses is
currently gathered
through EWARN,
under the category
‘other’
5 cases of
pulmonary TB
particular loca
or in areas tha
not affected O
duplication of
weekly averag
reported cases
pulmonary TB
the last 3 week
particular loca
in endemic ar
EWARS, Early Warning and Response System; EWARN, Early Warning and Response Nsafety risks involved for those engaged in data gathering.21 Both
EWARS and EWARN now produce weekly reports, and increased
sentinel site coverage offers a more complete picture of case
reporting for communicable disease than at any stage in theARN for acute ﬂaccid paralysis, suspected measles, and tuberculosis
d Outbreak threshold
ACU EWARN WHO EWARS ACU EWARN
se 1 suspected
case
Cluster of 3 clinical
cases in a single
location over a 30-day
time period with at
least 1 laboratory-
conﬁrmed case
Occurrence of 4
reported clinical cases
of measles in a health
facility OR in a given
geographical area
within 1 week
se 1 suspected
case
1 conﬁrmed case (including laboratory
conﬁrmation) of poliomyelitis (deﬁnition common
to both systems)
 at a
tion
t are
R
e
 of
 in
s at a
tion
eas
Not applicable Not applicable
etwork; WHO, World Health Organization; ACU, Assistance Coordination Unit.
Figure 2. Total numbers of consultations by week, and number of reporting sentinel sites for EWARS and EWARN, 2014–15.
S.A. Ismail et al. / International Journal of Infectious Diseases 47 (2016) 15–2218preceding 5 years.22 However, changes in base population
numbers due to displacement, or as territory has changed hands,
make detailed analysis of disease burden impossible.
To some extent, trend shape and evolving sentinel site coverage
nationwide reﬂect major difﬁculties with surveillance, especially
in the early years of the conﬂict. Although a core communicable
disease surveillance system was in place in Syria before 2011 with
some moves towards computerization,23 it was under-developed.
Active surveillance for polio (as AFP) and measles occurred
primarily through primary healthcare unit case-reporting.24 Prior
to the conﬂict, Syria also had an active TB control programme,
which oversaw a reduction in TB prevalence from 85 per 100 000 in
1990 to 23 per 100 000 in 2011,25 but low case detection was a
signiﬁcant problem.26
In the ﬁrst year of the conﬂict, systematic surveillance broke
down and it was not until 18 months after the beginning of the
crisis that this deﬁcit began to be addressed. The WHO launched
EWARS in September 2012, but the precise geographical coverage
of this system was and remains unclear – with a focus on
government controlled areas (GCAs).27 The coverage of EWARS is
steadily improving, although some degree of double-counting with
EWARN is likely.28 NGCAs of the country are, for the most part,
covered by EWARN, which was established in June 2013 with
support from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC).29 EWARN gathers some data on areas of the country under
the control of Daesh (the so-called ‘Islamic State’), from which very
few reliable data are otherwise publicly available.
For TB, disruption of all aspects of the control programme,
including prevention, case ﬁnding, diagnosis, and management,
has led to an increase in cases amongst displaced populations. In
2014, the WHO recorded a TB rate of 19 per 100 000 and
3481 cases were notiﬁed, with an estimated 6.2% of new cases
and 31% of retreatment cases having multidrug-resistant TB
(MDR-TB). The current prevalence of TB – in both fully sensitive
and MDR-TB forms – is unknown due in part to the disrupted
nature of the infrastructure with limited facilities to diagnose
and treat TB, particularly in NGCAs; this may account for the
fewer cases recorded by EWARN, although under-reporting ispossible. Over-crowding, poor sanitation, and malnutrition amongst
displaced populations all encourage the spread of TB in this population.
The lack of information on the health status of prisoners in Syria – of
whom there are now large numbers on both sides – is a particular
concern in the context of TB, given what is known about the spread of
infection in incarcerated populations.30 Although the International
Committee of the Red Cross have been able to visit some detention
facilities, access to detainees nationwide remains poor.
At the regional level, the WHO led the creation of a network of
early warning systems across Syria and key surrounding countries
in late 2014, to improve the cross-border monitoring of disease.
However, issues of harmonization remain – not least because
systems in these countries use different week dates for reporting,
and Turkish sites are not included.31
3.2. Challenges to effective communicable disease prevention and
control: the broader view
The effectiveness of surveillance systems is one of many
barriers to communicable disease control in Syria. Other chal-
lenges to communicable disease control that have arisen in the
Syrian crisis are outlined in the sections that follow.
3.2.1. Laboratory and human resource capacity
Communicable disease surveillance is primarily case report-
based, a blunt tracking approach, especially for polio where clinical
illness (AFP) is documented in only a minority of infected
individuals and for which guidelines require laboratory conﬁrma-
tion.32 The practical difﬁculties of laboratory case-conﬁrmation in
the context of a dynamic conﬂict are, however, considerable.
Recommended approaches to suspected polio cases provide a clear
example: stool samples gathered in GCAs are tested in laboratories
in Damascus but must still be transported across the country with
the attendant risks to health workers involved;21 those gathered in
NGCAs must be transported abroad, commonly to Turkey, where
processing and the delivery of results are often delayed.32 The most
recent data available – from the third quarter of 2015 – suggest
that of those public health facilities still functional in Syria, 44%
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the capacity to perform the specialized tests required to conﬁrm
communicable disease cases. Understanding of the situation in
health facilities in NGCAs – where no comparable surveys have yet
been carried out – is limited. Furthermore, shortages of trained
health workers in some parts of the country are now acute.
Although robust data on the extent of worker ﬂight are not
available, remaining laboratory staff are overwhelmingly concen-
trated in GCAs – particularly Damascus and Tartous.33
Similarly, for TB, the nature and dynamics of the conﬂict in Syria
pose major challenges to delivery of ‘best’ care, including
laboratory conﬁrmation. It is estimated that in some areas,
including Aleppo, more than two-thirds of health facilities are
no longer functioning.34 Even where facilities exist, diagnostics,
particularly microbiological ones, are rarely available. In NGCAs,
for instance, there are no laboratories capable of mycobacterial
culture; at most, facilities are able to offer sputum smear testing for
the acid-fast bacilli of TB but not culture, therefore reported cases
are likely the tip of the iceberg. In this context, innovative
approaches are required to ensure that early case detection,
treatment initiation, contact tracing, and follow-up is implemen-
ted to reduce the risk of treatment interruption and subsequent
drug resistance. Promising models involving altered clinical
suspicion thresholds for TB using alternative markers of infection
(as now used in the Jordanian National TB Programme (NTP), and
discussed in more depth below) may offer practical ways forward
in addressing diagnostic challenges inside Syria.25
3.2.2. Outbreak preparedness and response
Outbreak preparedness and response in Syria has, in the main,
been handled in a post-hoc fashion since the conﬂict began – as
exempliﬁed by the polio outbreak in 2013–14. Prior to the
outbreak, no cases of indigenous polio had been recorded in Syria
since 1995, and the last laboratory-conﬁrmed case was in 1999. In
2013, the WHO announced that it had detected a ‘hot cluster’ of
cases in Deir Ezzor, with wild poliovirus type 1 found in two of
18 cases of reported AFP.35 Subsequently, 25 cases were reported
in Deir Ezzor, ﬁve in Aleppo, three in Idlib, two in Al-Hasakeh, and
one in Hama between October 2013 and January 2014.36
Subsequent testing conﬁrmed that a polio case in Iraq could be
traced to the original strain in Syria, and a Public Health Emergency
of International Concern (PHEIC) was declared,37 bringing in
agencies such as WHO, UNICEF, and the Global Polio Eradication
Initiative.38
Formal recognition of the outbreak prompted a multi-country
regional response, with a variety of actors involved in immuniza-
tion day campaigns in order to contain the outbreak, and
16 country-wide and localized campaigns in Syria.36 Reported
oral polio vaccine (OPV3) coverage nationwide had been greater
than 95% among those aged under 1 year in Syria between
2002 and 2010, but had fallen to 52% among those aged 12–23
months in the period preceding the outbreak,39 although these
ﬁgures are now contested.21 In any event, it is clear that coverage,
especially in opposition areas, was already far below minimum
standards.27 It was therefore particularly important that negotia-
tions occur at the start of the outbreak to ensure that the delivery of
bivalent oral polio vaccine was agreed across all opposition-held
areas.21 A vaccination drive was conducted in seven governorates
outside government control (Aleppo, Idlib, Latakia, Hama, Al-
Raqqah, Alhasakeh, and Deir Ezzor), led by eight Syrian and
regional NGOs with support from the ACU (the Polio Control Task
Force). Although a WHO and UNICEF-led strategic plan to govern
polio outbreaks was produced for Syria and surrounding countries,
this was not published until late November 2013, some weeks after
the outbreak had been ofﬁcially announced.40 Transmission was
ﬁnally halted after a series of mass vaccination campaigns heldacross the country reaching more than 2.9 million children under
5 years of age with repeat doses of oral polio vaccine.36 Syria is now
approaching 2 years without a reported case of polio, but it will be
another year before polio can be declared completely eradicated.35
3.2.3. Health governance disruption and coordination challenges
Many of the challenges described above are related to broader
health governance fragmentation as the conﬂict enters its sixth
year. Within Syria, health system oversight has largely been
outsourced to the WHO (GCAs) and ACU (NGCAs), but at least three
health systems now operate in parallel, including government,
opposition (Nusra, Free Syrian Army), Daesh, and semi-autono-
mous Kurdish areas. The ‘Whole of Syria’ approach, adopted in
September 2014 to better coordinate health activities by over
100 health responders in three hubs (Damascus, Amman, and
Gaziantep), has only been partially effective due to difﬁculties co-
ordinating the response across such a broad range of actors.22
3.2.4. Immunization and communicable disease prevention
Routine data collected by the WHO, UNICEF, and the World
Bank demonstrate a signiﬁcant decline in routine vaccination
coverage since the onset of the conﬂict in Syria in 2011, but also
suggest that ofﬁcial statistics consistently overestimated the
extent of coverage in the years leading up to the conﬂict, and
since 2011 (Figures 3 and 4). Having had above 95% coverage of
oral polio vaccination from 1996 until 2011 according to ofﬁcial
statistics (but 83% coverage according to WHO/UNICEF data),
coverage subsequently dropped to between 68% and 80% between
2011 and 2014 (52–75% according to WHO/UNICEF statistics).41
Likewise vaccination with the measles-containing vaccine dropped
for MCV1 and MCV2 from 99% coverage (82% according to WHO/
UNICEF) in 2010 to 71% and 66% coverage, respectively, in 2014
(54% and 49% from WHO/UNICEF ﬁgures).41 World Bank ﬁgures
show that the percentage of children aged 12–23 months
vaccinated for measles in Syria between 2011 and 2014 dropped
from 80% to 54%.42 Mass displacements and crowded conditions
have both led to increased outbreaks of measles, a principal cause
of child mortality in humanitarian emergencies.43 Fifty new cases
of suspected measles were reported over 27 weeks in 2014,44 and
there were 10 000 cases of measles reported in Syria and Turkey in
2014.35 WHO, UNICEF, and partners organized ﬁve immunization
campaigns in Syria between March 2011 and the end of 2012,21 but
the coverage varied depending on location and the security
situation.36
Adverse events, though rare, have contributed to problems with
vaccine delivery. In some parts of Syria there was increased
suspicion of vaccination campaigns after atracurium – an
intravenously-administered skeletal muscle relaxant – was found
to have been incorrectly used as a diluent for a measles/rubella
vaccination campaign in rural northern Syria in 2014, resulting in
the deaths of 15 children.45 This demonstrates the additional
difﬁculties in providing training and support to healthcare workers
working in areas of conﬂict and instability.
3.2.5. Challenges for communicable disease case management in
healthcare settings
Challenges to clinical case management for communicable
disease in Syria are well illustrated by the case of TB. Prior to
the conﬂict, directly observed treatment (DOT) was adminis-
tered by the Ministry of Health either in primary health clinics
or through outreach initiatives in Syria. Since the beginning of
the conﬂict, the destruction of healthcare facilities, health
worker ﬂight, and difﬁculties with follow-up and contact tracing
have made service delivery very challenging in NGCAs; inter-
rupted drug supplies and the estimated tens of thousands
imprisoned increase the likelihood of drug-resistant strains of
Figure 3. Trends in vaccination coverage for polio (in DTP1, DTP3, and Pol3 administration) for Syria, 2004–14. .
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that the NTP is still operative; however, the referral of suspected
cases from NGCAs may endanger the lives of patients or
their families. The increase in TB cases in countries surrounding
Syria, particularly Lebanon and Jordan, has been attributed to
Syrian refugees,25 with Lebanon reporting a 27% increased
incidence. In collaboration with the International Organization
for Migration, the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR), and the CDC, the Jordanian NTP developed
a public health strategy for TB amongst Syrian refugees to
increase case detection. This included ensuring adequate access
to refugees, available human resources, quality assured diag-
nostic laboratory facilities, drug procurement, capacity to
deliver DOT, and follow-up for cases.25 Given low smear-
positive rates, amongst other reasons, the NTP altered the
clinical suspicion threshold to include suspected cases who are
smear-negative but have had a cough for more than 3 weeks,
have not responded to non-TB antibiotics, and have chest
radiograph changes consistent with TB.25Figure 4. Trends in BCG and MCV1 and 2 coverage for TB (red line4. Discussion
Despite improvements in communicable disease surveillance
system coverage in Syria in recent months, major challenges to
effective monitoring, prevention, and control remain. The dynamic
nature of the ﬁghting, the scale and rapidity of population
movements, the extent of degradation to healthcare facilities
and other core infrastructure, and threats to the safety of health
workers, all impose signiﬁcant constraints on the effectiveness of
communicable disease surveillance and control. As the evidence
reviewed above demonstrates, epidemiological trends for key
communicable diseases remain difﬁcult to describe from an
intervention-targeting perspective. Furthermore, there are some
diseases – including HIV/AIDS – for which very few data are
currently available from Syria, despite cross-regional evidence that
rates may be rising faster in the Middle East and North Africa than
anywhere else in the world (albeit from a comparatively low level)
and evidence of rising prevalence among certain risk-groups.46,47
In a practical sense, assessment of the strength of communicables) and measles (yellow and blue lines), respectively, 2004–14.
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using existing frameworks (e.g., the IHRs) is challenging. The IHRs
emphasize central capacity-building and institutional oversight in
a way that may no longer be practical in Syria, both because
government legitimacy is essentially contested and because
governance structures are fragmented.
Recommendations for strengthening communicable disease
control in Syria must begin with improved coordination between
surveillance systems. There is a need to strengthen coordination of
disease surveillance not just inside Syria but across the region. In
addition to the regional system implemented by the WHO in
collaboration with neighbouring governments described above,
there are moves towards regional data integration through a
community-level assessment programme (ECAP) and health
surveillance programme being piloted by Me´decins Sans Fron-
tie`res in Iraq and extended to Lebanon and Jordan in 2016
(personal communication, Me´decins Sans Frontie`res).
Within Syria there is a continuing need to ensure that both
EWARN and EWARS (1) use consistent case, alert, and outbreak
threshold deﬁnitions, and (2) publish clear (and ideally geographi-
cal information system-linked) information on the extent of their
geographical coverage, with a view to the creation of a single,
robust data repository that allows for queries across geographic
area and time. With respect to improved case identiﬁcation, the
development of basic or mobile laboratory capacity that is clearly
tied to EWARN and EWARS case-reporting would improve the
promptness of diagnosis. Alternatively, clearer clinical guidance
based on parsimonious case deﬁnitions and increased use of
presumptive treatment may be needed.
The breakdown of basic health systems and primary healthcare,
mobile populations, and security issues in reaching some of the
most vulnerable populations in Syria mean that vaccination
remains a challenge. However, the success of the Polio Task Force
in accessing populations across territory controlled by a number of
actors, including Daesh, illustrates that vaccination coverage can
be improved rapidly if existing networks are capitalized on and
local agreements brokered. Ongoing work to improve vaccine
technology to increase ease of administration, including having
fewer doses and being more thermostable, may over the long term
make substantial contributions to prevention and control in
conﬂict settings.44
From a case management perspective, evidence on TB suggests
that simpler case deﬁnitions could be used in NGCAs inside Syria to
allow treatment on suspicion of TB given the lack of available
diagnostics. However, in these populations, with high proportions
displaced, some more than once, management with appropriate
compliance monitoring and follow-up is challenging. Patient-held
records, whether in paper or electronic format, could be an
appropriate measure to ensure continuity. DOT is challenging in
this context with ongoing conﬂict, displacement, overwhelmed
health facilities, and road blocks in place; innovative measures
may include video-observed therapy (VOT), particularly in
relatively stable areas, which has been tested in middle-income
settings elsewhere.48More broadly, antimicrobial stewardship and
infection prevention and control measures are important in
containing what could become an increasingly important public
health issue both within Syria and in neighbouring countries and
increasingly challenging to contain.
Although beyond the scope of this paper, data on the extent to
which antimicrobial resistance affects case management in Syria
and surrounding countries, especially for bone and soft tissue
injuries, provide an important barometer of laboratory function-
ality.49 Health infrastructure damage, the exodus of trained
healthcare workers, and poor sanitation, alongside poor antiseptic
technique, antibiotic stewardship, and health facility crowding
provide fertile ground for resistance to develop. Little is knownabout antimicrobial resistance in Syria pre-conﬂict; however the
overuse of antibiotics, their availability without prescription, and
interrupted treatment courses due to inadequate supply or
inability of patients to pay for a full course, may all contribute
to resistance in this setting. In most healthcare facilities,
microbiology diagnostics are not available or quality-assured.
Although there are few recent reports, a study from Aleppo in
2014 reported rates of multidrug-resistant Pseudomonas of 54%.50
Reports from neighbouring countries state multidrug-resistant
bacteria isolated from Syrian patients of up to 69%,51 although this
may not be representative of the situation inside Syria. Support and
capacity building to the few remaining microbiology facilities in
NGCAs could support the early detection of resistant bacteria,
amongst other pathogens.
This article concludes with two broader observations. First,
coordinated action now to develop surveillance and control
systems offers an opportunity to set in place foundations for
nationwide governance systems and the backbone for a post-
conﬂict health system for Syria. Negotiations over the creation of
these systems could provide neutral spaces for agreement of
common principles between warring parties; interruption of polio
transmission and even efforts towards eradication have been
possible in other conﬂict settings through community involvement
and negotiation of ceaseﬁres or truces.52 Second, failure to address
communicable disease surveillance and control shortfalls in Syria
presents major challenges to surrounding countries. This is
demonstrated both by evidence on TB as cited above and by the
well-recognized rises in caseload of cutaneous leishmaniasis
among Syrian refugees in Lebanon (particularly Leishmania tropica,
which requires prolonged, sometimes parenteral therapy) and
Iraq53; this has prompted pesticide spraying campaigns, enhanced
surveillance, and the distribution of free medication by the
Lebanese government.54 Real-time tracking of cases, education
of health workers, improved availability of diagnostics for
challenging cases, and availability of appropriate treatment early
in the outbreak in Syria would have helped avert this situation.55
Robust and coordinated action is needed now to meet the
challenge from diseases like TB, which typically have few clinical
signs in the early stages of infection.
Conﬂict of interest: No conﬂict of interest to declare.
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